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Congress has created a sprawling statutory landscape of 
antidiscrimination laws that prevent employers from considering 
certain protected characteristics when deciding workplace matters. 
Enacted in 1964, Title VII prohibits an employer from considering 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1 Enacted in 1967, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits an employer 
from considering age.2 Finally, enacted in 1990, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from impermissibly 
considering disability.3 Though all three statutes feature unique 
substantive provisions, originally they each shared identical causation 
phrasing.4 Specifically, these three civil rights statutes collectively 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S., Dec. 2006, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 
105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(2) (2006). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a)(1), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3557 (2008).  
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1988) (forbidding an employer to act 
adversely to an employee’s interests “because of such individual’s race, color, 
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prohibited employers from discriminating against any employee 
“because of” race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
disability.5 Congress and the Court have spoken definitively to the 
precise causation scheme of Title VII6 and the ADEA7 but remained 
largely silent as to the ADA. Without clear instructions, courts 
interpreting the ADA must look to relevant yet inconclusive guidance 
from the Title VII and ADEA contexts and determine whether either 
of these statutes’ divergent interpretations are applicable to the ADA.  
 
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES: THE INTERPLAY OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS, CIRCUIT CASE LAW, AND CONGRESSIONAL 
REACTIONS 
 
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Title VII’s Original Mixed-Motive 
Causation Framework 
 
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
held that a plaintiff could meet its burden in a Title VII employment 
discrimination claim through a showing of mixed-motive causation.8 
Amy Hopkins was a senior manager at the national accounting firm, 
Price Waterhouse.9 In 1982, a superior proposed her for partnership; 
her candidacy was neither accepted nor denied, but rather accepted for 
“reconsideration.”10 Her evaluations hinged on her aggressive and 
forthright nature, which led to both glowing praise and scathing 
                                                                                                                   
religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) 
(forbidding an employer to act adversely to an employee’s interests “because of such 
individual’s age) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (prohibiting 
covered entities from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual”) (emphasis added).  
5 Id.  
6 § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (explicitly providing for mixed-motive causation). 
7 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009) (5–4 decision) 
(explicitly holding that the ADEA requires but-for causation). 
8 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991). 
 9 Id. at 231.  
10 Id.  
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criticism.11 While her strong character had caused the firm to secure a 
multi-million dollar contract with the state, it had also caused her co-
workers and supervisors to describe her as macho, impatient, and 
difficult to work with.12 
 The Court noted that the plaintiff could meet her burden under 
Title VII without showing that gender discrimination was the but-for 
cause of the employer’s decision to delay her candidacy.13 Most 
simply put, the Court stated, “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as 
colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation’ . . . is to misunderstand 
them.”14 Instead, Hopkins could meet her burden through a showing 
of mixed-motive causation.15 Thus, even if the defendant’s decisio
relied on legitimate weaknesses in Hopkins’ credentials, Hopkins 
could still prevail if she could show that the defendant also relied on 
impermissible sexual stereotyping, a form of gender discrimination.
n 
                                                
16 
However, the Court also held that once a plaintiff met her burden 
through a mixed-motive claim, the defendant had the opportunity to 
completely escape liability through an affirmative defense.17 
Specifically, the employer will not be liable under Title VII if it shows 
that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of the 
discriminatory consideration.18  
 
B. The 1991 Amendments: Congress’s Modification of Price 
Waterhouse’s Title VII Causation Framework 
 
 Following the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Amendments), which, inter alia, 
responded to the Price Waterhouse opinion.19 Part of its response 
 
11 Id. at 234–35. 
12 Id. at 235. 
13 Id. at 244. 
14 Id. at 240.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 244, 251. 
17 Id. at 246.  
18 Id. at 244–45.  
19 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 29, 42 U.S.C.). 
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codified the Court’s interpretation that “because of” supports a mixed-
motive claim.20 Congress explicitly provided for such causation by 
exchanging the original Title VII causation language with:  
 
Except as otherwise provided in this [title], an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.21  
 
Notably, the 1991 Amendments did not alter the causation language in 
the ADA or ADEA, which remained “because of.”22  
The 1991 Amendments also responded to the Price 
Waterhouse decision by overriding its holding that an employer could 
present an affirmative defense following a plaintiff’s showing of 
mixed-motive causation.23 Whereas the Court’s holding had relieved 
an employer of all liability if it convinced the fact-finder that it would 
have taken the same action in the absence of illegal motive, Congress 
amended Title VII to authorize declaratory relief and attorney’s fees in 
such a situation.24 However, while ultimately liable, courts cannot 
grant the employee “damages or issue an order requiring any 
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment” if the 
defendant can show that legitimate considerations could independently 







                                                 
20 § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
21 Id. (emphasis added). 
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12112. 
23 § 107 (b)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)) 
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
25 § 107 (b)(i)–(ii) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B)(i)–(ii)). 
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C. Circuit Court Approaches to ADA Causation Following Price 
Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments 
 
 Following both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments, 
nearly all of the federal circuit courts, including the Seventh Circuit,26 
applied mixed-motive causation to the ADA context.27 In doing so, 
they relied on both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Amendments.28 
Price Waterhouse had found the phrase “because of” to include 
mixed-motive claims, and the Amendments were construed to 
demonstrate congressional agreement with such an interpretation.29 
With reinforcement from both the Court and Congress, federal circuit 
courts comfortably authorized mixed-motive claims under the ADA.30 
The Sixth Circuit was the lone circuit to hold that in order for 
plaintiffs to recover under the ADA, they would need to show that 
their disability was the sole cause of the discrimination.31  
 
D. Gross v. FBL Financial Services: ADEA’s But-For Causation 
Framework 
 
In 2009, the Court revisited the issue of causation under 
employment discrimination statutes in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, which involved a claim brought under the ADEA.32 Jack 
                                                 
26 Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999); see 
Alek v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 54 F. App’x. 224, 225 (7th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). 
27 Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Head v. Glacier 
Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005); Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp., 
Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003); Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d 
21, 25 (1st Cir. 2002); Baird ex. rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 
1999); Owen v. Thermatool Corp., 155 F.3d 137, 139 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998);  Doane v. 
City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 1997); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner 
Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996); see Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield 
Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 2002). 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 454 (6th Cir. 2004). 
32 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009). 
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Gross had worked as a claims administrator director for FBL Financial 
Group since 1971.33 In 2003, Gross’s employer reassigned the fifty-
four-year-old to a new position, filling his former duty with an 
employee in her early forties whom Gross had previously 
supervised.34 While the employer argued that the reassignment had 
been the product of a necessary corporate restructuring, Gross
that the reassignment violated the ADEA because it was really a 






                                                
35 Following a trial, the jury found th
the preponderance of all of the evidence, age was a motivating factor
in the employer’s decision to reassign Gross because it had played a 
part in the employer’s decision.36 The employer appealed, arguing tha
in order to sustain a finding of liability under mixed-motive causation
Gross would need to provide direct evidence that it had considered age 
in the reassignment.37  
  The Supreme Court never reached the issue granted on 
certiorari; instead, the Court held that regardless of the type of 
evidence that ADEA plaintiffs produce, they cannot shift the burden to 
the defendant upon a mixed-motive assertion.38 As it did in Price 
Waterhouse, the Court interpreted the phrase “because of.”39 In direct 
contrast to its precedent twenty years prior, in Gross, the Court found 
the language to require a showing of “but-for” causation.40 The Court 
explicitly rejected Price Waterhouse as instructive authority because 
of the 1991 Amendments.41 It reasoned that where Congress amends 
one piece of legislation, but remains silent regarding similar statutes, it 
is presumed to have acted purposefully; thus, the Court found that 
Congress had intended Title VII’s amended causation scheme to 
operate differently from the ADEA’s untouched scheme.42 
 
33 Id. at 2346. 
34 Id. at 2346–47. 
35 Id. at 2347. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 2348.  
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 2349. 
42 Id.  
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 In a particularly sharp-tongued dissent, Justice Stevens, joined 
by three other Justices, criticized the majority’s “crabbed 
interpretation”43 for blurring the lines of separation of powers and 
“engag[ing] in unnecessary lawmaking.”44 The dissent found the 
majority’s holding to be a usurpation of congressional discretion in 
order to effectuate a radical change in the policy of antidiscrimination 
statutes.45 Justice Stevens also criticized the majority for its poor legal 
reasoning: “[u]nfortunately, the majority’s inattention to prudential 
Court practices is matched by its utter disregard of our precedent and 
Congress’ intent.”46 The dissent argued that Price Waterhouse was 
binding because it provided a relevant statutory analysis of the phrase 
“because of.”47 Additionally, the 1991 Amendments ratified this 
interpretation, thus reflecting congressional intent that 
antidiscrimination statutes should authorize mixed-motive claims.48 
Finally, though the 1991 Amendments did override Price 
Waterhouse’s conclusion pertaining to the employer’s ultimate 
liability, the dissent quite logically stated that Price Waterhouse’s 
“affirmative defense did not alter the meaning of ‘because of.’”49 
 
E. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.: The Seventh Circuit’s 
Extension of Gross to the ADA Context 
 
In Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., the Seventh Circuit, 
in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Rovner, found that Kathleen 
Serwatka could not recover under the ADA despite the trial court’s 
conclusion that Rockwell had made an employment decision, at least 
in part, based on its perception that Serwatka was disabled.50 In 
January 1988, Serwatka began working at Rockwell Automation, a 
                                                 
43 Id. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50 591 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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worldwide manufacturer of industrial automation components.51 
Around that time, she was diagnosed with a rotator cuff tear.52 As a 
result of this condition, Serwatka’s physician issued several work 
restrictions, including that her employer limit her to sedentary work 
and refrain from assigning her tasks that required her to lift more than 
ten pounds.53 Rockwell assigned her to the task of assembling drives, 
a job which she could perform while sitting.54 Over the years, these
drives became obsolete, and the need for Serwatka’s duty declined 
accordingly.
 
                                                
55  
There were notable factual disputes between Serwatka and 
Rockwell. For example, while Serwatka asserted that her physician 
lifted her work restrictions in 1999, Rockwell argued that it was 
unaware of her revised restrictions until 2004.56 Additionally, while 
Serwatka asserted that she no longer needed to be limited to sedentary 
tasks, Rockwell contended that it believed that her work restrictions 
continued to limit her ability to perform any jobs involving standing or 
walking.57 On June 16, 2004, Rockwell Automation terminated 
Serwatka’s employment.58  
 Following a trial, the jury made two findings: (1) Rockwell 
“terminate[d Serwatka] due to its perception that she was substantially 
limited in her ability to walk or stand,” and (2) Rockwell would have 
“discharged [Serwatka] if it did not believe she was substantially 
limited in her ability to walk or stand, but everything else remained the 
same.”59 The Eastern District of Wisconsin, finding that the jury had 
 
51 Brief and Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant, Rockwell 
Automation, Inc. at 5, Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 08-4010 (7th Cir. 
Feb. 10, 2009), 2009 WL 927655.  
52 Brief and Supplemental Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Serwatka v. 
Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 08-4010 (7th Cir. March 17, 2009), 2009 WL 
927656. 
53 Id.   
54 Brief of Defendant, supra note 51, at 5. 
55 Id.   
56 Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 52, at 7.  
57 Id.; Brief of Defendant, supra note 51, at 5.  
58 Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 52, at 7. 
59 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 958 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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established a cognizable mixed-motive ADA claim, had granted 
Serwatka declaratory relief and attorney’s fees.60   
The Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the ADA 
does not recognize mixed-motive causation.61 Judge Rovner noted that 
in the absence of the recently-decided Gross decision, the Seventh 
Circuit would have affirmed, continuing the circuit’s practice of 
finding mixed-motive claims viable under the ADA.62 In light of 
Gross, however, the Seventh Circuit found that because the ADA does 
not mimic Title VII’s “motivating factor” language, it, like the ADEA, 
requires a plaintiff to show but-for causation.63  
 Lastly, of significance, Judge Rovner revealed in a footnote 
that Serwatka’s holding may not survive the effectiveness of the ADA 
Amendments, which changed the “because of” language in the ADA 
to “on the basis of.”64 Judge Rovner stated, “[w]hether ‘on the basis 
of’ means anything different from ‘because of,’ and whether this or 
any other revision to the statute matters in terms of the viability of a 
mixed-motive claim under the ADA, are not questions that we need to 
consider in this appeal.”65  
 
F. The Seventh Circuit’s Broad Treatment of Gross Outside the 
Antidiscrimination Context 
 
The Seventh Circuit has understood Gross in extremely broad 
terms.66 Not only has it held that Gross disallows any 
                                                 
60 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996 (E.D. Wis. 
2008). 
61 Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962. 
62 Id. at 963 (“The district court certainly cannot be faulted for not anticipating 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross; our own prior decisions had held that mixed-
motive claims were viable under the ADA . . . But in view of the Court’s intervening 
decision in Gross, it is clear that [Serwatka’s award] cannot be sustained”).  
63 Id. at 962.  
64 Id. at 962 n.1.  
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 961 (construing Gross to mean that “when another anti-discrimination 
statute lacks comparable language [to Title VII’s “motivating factor” phrase], a 
mixed-motive claim will not be viable under that statute”).  
 364
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antidiscrimination statute to authorize mixed-motive causation absent 
Title VII’s “motivating factor” language, but it has also held that 
Gross disallows mixed-motive causation in statutory contexts entirely 
outside the realm of antidiscrimination.67 For example, in Serafinn v. 
Local 722, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Seventh 
Circuit mimicked Serwatka, holding that the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) did not allow for mixed-
motive claims because its statutory language did not include the phrase 
“motivating factor.”68 Notably, the LMRDA, which does not deal with 
discrimination, is hardly analogous to the ADEA.69 Similarly, in 
Fairley v. Andrews, the Seventh Circuit held that because 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 does not include language identical to Title VII, Gross 
mandates plaintiffs to show but-for causation in asserting First 
Amendment claims under this statutory provision.70 Like the 
LMRDA, § 1983 is not cleanly analogous to the ADEA.71 The 
combination of Serwatka, Serafinn, and Fairley indicates that the 
Seventh Circuit has completely disregarded Gross’s own direction to
“be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a 
 
                                                 
67 Serafinn v. Local 722, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“Mixed-motive theories of liability are always improper in suits brought 
under statutes without language comparable to the Civil Rights Act’s authorization 
of claims that an improper consideration was a ‘motivating factor’ for the contested 
action”); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525–26 (7th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. 
filed (U.S. Dec. 21, 2009) (No. 09-745) (holding that plaintiffs must show but-for 
causation in First Amendment claims brought under § 1983 as a result of the Gross 
decision). 
68 Id.  
69 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 621 (stating that the purpose of the ADEA is to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the workplace and to ensure that employers 
assess older employees according only to their abilities) with 29 U.S.C. § 401 
(stating that the main purpose of LMRDA is to ensure that employees are free from 
corruption and unfairness resulting from employer and labor organization 
misconduct).  
70 578 F.3d at 525–26. 
71 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 621 (indicating that the purpose of the ADEA is to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in the workplace and to ensure that employers 
assess older employees according only to their abilities) with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(indicating that the main purpose of § 1983 is to provide a civil remedy for those 
who are deprived of rights).  
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different statute without careful and critical examination.”72 Instead, 
the Seventh Circuit has transformed Gross’s ADEA holding into a 
blanket rule applying to all statutes, blindly prohibiting mixed-motive 











      
w
G. Other Circuit Courts’ Reactions to Gross 
 Because of its recentness, Gross’s effect has not had time to
fully manifest in other courts. However, decisions from the Third, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have already surfaced indicating that the 
Seventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of Gross will likely be an 
outlier.73 The most noteworthy of these cases is Smith v. Xerox, C
where in direct contrast to Serwatka’s holding, the Fifth Circuit 
expressly rejected the proposition that Gross requires but-for causati
in any statutory provision that lacks Title VII’s “motivating factor” 
language.74 Instead, Xerox held that Title V
ommodate mixed-motive claims.75  
Serwatka and Xerox explored facts that were notably similar:
the 1991 Amendments left both the ADA’s causation provision and 
Title VII’s retaliation provision untouched, while explicitly providing
for mixed-motive causation in Title VII’s intentional discrimination 
provision.76 While Serwatka found this factual pattern to necessarily 
fall under the command of Gross,77 the Fifth Circuit held that such a
                                           




hat ERCLA claims should be analyzed under the same standards as the 
ADE
x,  602 F.3d at 328. 
well Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Xero
1. 
ess Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)). 
73 See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 2010); Brown v. J. 
Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009); Hunter v. Valley View Local Schs., 
579 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009); but see Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 62




75 Id.  
76 Serwatka v. Rock
x, 602 F.3d at 328. 
77 Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 96
 366
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simplified application of Gross was incorrect.78 Xerox did not read 
Gross as requiring any and all statutes to possess “motivating fact
language in order to authorize mixed-motive causation.
or” 
n 








                                                
79 Rather, 
Xerox stated that “the Gross Court made clear that its focus was o
ADEA claims[,]” and to extend Gross to other statutory contexts 
would be “contrary to [the Court’s] admonition against intermingling 
interpretations of the two statutory schemes.”80 Thus, Xerox held that 
Title VII’s retaliation provision provides for mixed-motive causation, 
ough its text does not include the phrase “motivating factor.”81
Similarly, in Hunter v. Valley View Schools, the Sixth Circ
declined to extend Gross outside of the ADEA context.82 Pri
Gross, the Sixth Circuit, guided by Title VII precedent, had 
recognized mixed-motive causation under the Family and Medica
Leave Act (FMLA).83 Had the Sixth Circuit interpreted Gross as 
Serwatka had, it would have held that the FMLA no longer rec
mixed-motive causation because the FMLA lacks Title VII’s 
“motivating factor” language.84 Yet, the Sixth Circuit, like the Fifth 
Circuit, did not interpret Gross so broadly.85 Rather, it held that Gross
did not compel any result; it merely required the Court to “revisit the 
propriety of applying Title VII precedent to the FMLA.”86 Ult
the Sixth Circuit held that Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive 
ork was still applicable to FMLA retaliation claims.87  
Finally, in Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., the Third Circuit held that the 
Price Waterhouse causation framework continued to apply to claims 
 




See also Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 
2010
ter, 579 F.3d at 691.  
78 Xerox, 60
79 See id.   
80 Id. a
81 Id.  
82 579 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In light of our reading of the FMLA 
through the lens provided by Gross, we continue to find Price
ing framework applicable to FMLA retaliation claims”). 




86 Id.  
87 Id. at 692.  
 367
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brought under § 1981 following the Gross decision.88 The court s
that Gross had no impact on its analysis because § 1981’s text is 





causation under the ADA following Gross.93  
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING DIFFERENT STATUTES 





                                                
89 While § 1981 does not have the 
“because of” language found in the ADEA, it also does not have the 
phrase “motivating factor” found in Title VII.90 Despite this, the court 
held that § 1981 should be interpreted in step with Title VII because 
their similar statutory goals and contexts.91 In addition to the Thir
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits’ narrower Gross readings, district court 
decisions have deviated from the Seventh Circuit’s approach in 
interpreting Gross.92 Several district courts within the ambit of the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have continued to rec
 
II. CIRCUIT COURT STATUTORY ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF RELEVANT 
 
 
Ultimately, whether the ADA allows plaintiffs to assert
through a showing of mixed-motive causation is a question of 
statutory analysis. The first step in analyzing a statute is to determine 
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous me
if so, the court is bound by such language.94 The plainness or 
ambiguity of the language is determined by reference to the text itself,
the specific context in which the text is used, and the broader con
 
F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009). 




Com  SFAILA, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 637, 645 (E.D. La. 2009).  
nson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1996). 
88 581 
89 Id.  
90 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have the same right in every State
e, be parties, give evidence . . .”). 
91 Brown, 581 F.3d at 182 n.5.  
92 E.g., Williamson v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. H-07-3776, 2010 WL 774140, at 
*12 (S.D. Tex. March 12, 2010); Manickavasagar v. Va. Univ. Sch. of Med., 6
Supp. 2d 635, 644 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2009); U.S. Equal Employment Opportu
m’n. v.
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of the statute as a whole.95 However, in Serwatka, Judge Rovner 
bypassed the first fundamental step of statutory analysis, beginning the 
opinion not with an independent and isolated examination of the ADA
phrase “because of,” but instead with an examination o
Court’s prior interpretation of this phrase in different 
antidiscrimination statutes.
 








 Supreme Court had created controlling precedent on the 
issue.10
                                                
96 Judge Rovner’s re-routing of traditional 
statutory analysis was not in error, as the Supreme Court has held that
decided issues of statutory analysis are afforded a super presu
of stare decisis.97 This presumption forces into the Serwatka 
discussion three different decisions, all of which have previously 
d the phrase “because of” in an antidiscrimination statute.98  
The first case to be considered is Foster v. Arthur And
LLP, a 1999 Seventh Circuit decision, holding that the ADA 
recognizes mixed-motive causation.99 Horizontal stare decisis, or the 
concept that a panel’s decision binds all subsequent panels within that
circuit, is as strong as the super presumption of stare decisis towards 
Supreme Court statutory interpretations.100 Joining a majority of the
other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly adopted this super 
presumption of horizontal stare decisis within the realm of statutory




95 Id.  
96 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 959 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Our analysis of this issue begins with Price Waterhouse”).  
97 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (stating that considerations of 
stare decisis have special effect when a previous court has interpreted statutory 
language).  
98 See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029 
(7th Cir. 1999). 
99 168 F.3d at 1033. 
100 Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Court of Appeals, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (2005). 
101 See id.; Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994).  
102 See Steinberg, 32 F.3d at 272.  
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Of course, the Supreme Court has twice interpreted the phras
“because of” in antidiscrimination statutes; thus, two more cases 
necessarily enter the Serwatka analysis. First, the Court interpreted 







lding of the Court’s Title VII and 
ADEA cases are not binding, their rationale may be, if it comfortably 
exte
 
B. Varying Circuit Court Approaches in Relying on Analogous 
 
 
Circuit, for example, does not consider Supreme Court precedent 
                                                
103 Second, twenty years lat
Court analyzed “because of” in Gross, finding the same phrase in 
ADEA to equate to but-for causation.104 Though both of these 
decisions are largely relevant to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in 
Serwatka, they do not warrant a strict, blind application.105 Per the 
Gross Court’s instruction, “[w]hen conducting statutory interpretation,
the Court ‘must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.’ 
”106 This instruction indicates that though these two cases and their 
interpretation of “because of” are relevant to the Serwatka ADA is
they are not conclusive because neither speak directly to the ADA.107 
However, while the ultimate ho
nds to the ADA context.   
Supreme Court Precedent 
 
Federal appeals courts disagree on how to approach statutory
interpretation where circuit precedent is directly on point and pertains 
to the statute in question, and instructive Supreme Court precedent 
also exists, but relates to a different statute. The Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have undergone fairly flexible analyses in deciding 
whether Supreme Court precedent binds their decisions. The Second 
 
103 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241–242. 
104 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009). 
105 See id. at 2349 (stating that it is inappropriate to apply the Court’s 
interpretation of one statute to a different statute without engaging in independent 
analysis). 
106 Id. (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)). 
107 Id. (ADEA); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (Title VII). 
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binding unless the Court’s reasoning applies to the different statu





e Court decision simply causes 
tension
eral 
er such reasoning is relevant to the context of the 
statute in question.  
 
                                                
108 Similarly, the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have not explicitly stated a standard, but have simply 
reconsidered their precedent in light of intervening Supreme Court 
precedent, following the intervening decision only if they find the 
related statutes to be completely analogous.109 Slightly less de
to the Supreme Court interpretation, the Fifth Circuit will not 
“overrule the decision of a prior [circuit] panel unless such overruling 
is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.”110
Finally, employing a greater level of adherence to the Supreme Court 
interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit will overturn prior circuit 
precedent if the intervening Suprem
 with or undermines it.111  
Despite the slight differences in the level of deference that 
appeals courts afford to such Supreme Court precedent, one gen
rule stems: no circuit court finds that Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting one statute is automatically binding to different statutes 
merely because both laws share common language. Rather, all circuit 





108 Castellano v. N.Y.C., 142 F.3d 58, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1998).  
109 See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (finding that Robinson’s interpretation of Title VII’s ambiguous language 
did not affect prior circuit interpretation of the ADA, which was unambiguous); see 
Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
Robinson rationale is inapplicable to the ADA because while recognizning former 
employees under Title VII would increase the statute’s effectiveness, doing so under 
the ADA would create a perverse incentive for the employer not to offer disability 
benefits at all). 
110 Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in 
original). 
111 Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1045 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated 
pending a reh’g en banc. 
 371
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
C. A Helpful Example: Interpreting “Employee” under the ADA in 
Light of the Court’s Analogous Title VII Decision, Robinson v. Shell 
Oil, Inc. 
 
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ evolving interpretation of 
the ADA’s use of the word “employees” serves as a helpful example 
in showing how circuit courts approach statutory analysis of one 
statute when the Supreme Court has interpreted identical wording in a 
different statute. Prior to 1997, the Supreme Court had been silent as 
to whether the word “employee” in any of the antidiscrimination 
statutes included former employees. Under independent circuit 
analyses, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held that the ADA’s 
“employee” language only referred to current employees.112 Following 
these cases, the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil, Inc. held that 
Title VII’s use of the same word also encompassed former 
employees.113 After Robinson, new ADA cases presented the circuits 
with the tasks of re-examining whether the ADA includes former 
employees and detangling two different, seemingly controlling 
precedents.114 On the one hand, the previous circuit cases, EEOC v. 
CNA Insurance Companies and Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, 
Inc., were directly on point because their analyses specifically 
concerned the ADA’s language.115 However, Robinson also demanded 
attention because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of an identical 
word, albeit in the context of a different statute, could mandate the 





                                                 
112 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 
1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 
1528 (11th Cir. 1996).  
113 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1996). 
114 See Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1036; Morgan, 268 F.3d at 457. 
115 CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1041, 1045; Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528.  
116 519 U.S. at 346. 
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1. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach in Johnson v. K- Mart Corp. 
 
In examining the ADA’s meaning of “employee,” the Eleventh 
Circuit in Johnson v. K Mart Corp. held that its prior precedent could 
not withstand Robinson.117 Robinson had reasoned that the term 
“employees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision was ambiguous 
because there was no temporal qualifier preceding it; thus, the Court 
construed the word in accordance with the broader statutory purpose 
of Title VII.118 Noting that some ADA recitations of “employee” were 
similarly ambiguous, the Eleventh Circuit overruled Gonzales because 
it found tension between its prior holdings and the Court’s 
interpretation.119 The concurring judge agreed while clarifying the 
proper approach in assessing whether Gonzales withstood 
Robinson.120 “[Federal circuit courts] are … compelled to overrule 
[their] precedent when the rationale the Supreme Court uses in a [sic] 
intervening case directly contradicts the analysis that [the circuit] has 
used in a related area, and establishes that [the circuit’s] current rule is 
wrong.”121 Both the majority and concurrence found that the r
behind Robinson’s statutory analysis of Title VII’s retaliation 





overlapped with and weakened some of the reasoning in Gonzales, 
                                                
on.122  
However, the dissent strongly argued that Gonzales should 
remain good law because Robinson did not address any ADA iss
and did not purport to overrule Gonzales.123 Therefore, because 
Robinson, a Title VII case, was not “squarely on point” with th
issue, the Eleventh Circuit should have adhered to its existing 
precedent in Gonzales.124 Conceding that Robinson may have 
 
117 Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1047. 
118 Id. at 1043 (summarizing the Robinson decision).  
119 Id. at 1045. 
120 Id. at 1063 (Barkett, J., concurring). 
121 Id. (emphasis in original). 
122 Id. at 1047, 1063. 
123 Id. at 1065 (Carnes, J., dissenting).  
124 Id. at 1067. 
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Judge Carnes insisted that a mere undermining of circuit precedent did 
not warrant an overruling of it:   
 
It is critical that when sitting as panel judges we be diligent in 
policing the line between prior precedent that has been 
contradicted and thereby overruled by intervening Supreme 
Court precedent, and that which has been only weakened by it. 
The strength and integrity of our prior precedent rule, upon 
which so much rests, is dependent upon that distinction.125  
 
Though in disagreement about the extent to which an intervening 
Supreme Court case need conflict with circuit case law in order to 
overrule it, all three Eleventh Circuit judges agreed that the point of 
comparison is the rationale behind the relevant cases.126 Within the 
debate, no judge contended that mere comparison of statutory text was 
sufficient.127 Despite this shared approach, the dissent came to a 
different ultimate conclusion.128 Judge Carnes reasoned that the 
rationale of Robinson could not extend to the ADA context because 
Title VII’s retaliation provisions and the ADA’s intentional 
discrimination provisions are largely divergent in purpose and 
legislative history.129 Without a similar background or context, 
rationale used to interpret Title VII retaliation claims could not apply 
to the ADA.130  
 
2. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach in Morgan v. Joint Administration 
Board 
 
In contrast to Johnson, the Seventh Circuit in Morgan v. Joint 
Administration Board held that its prior precedent did withstand 
Robinson and that ADA’s “employee” language continued to exclude 
                                                 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 1047, 1063, 1065. 
127 See id.  
128 Id. at 1065 (Carnes, J., dissenting). 
129 Id.  
130 See id.  
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former employees.131 Even though Robinson had interpreted identical 
language in an analogous statute, the Seventh Circuit, focusing on the 
specific policy consequences of including retired employees under the 
ADA, found the difference between Title VII’s “employees” in 
retaliation claims and the ADA’s “employees” in intentional 
discrimination claims to be “stark.”132 Allowing retired employees 
with disabilities to challenge disparate benefits under the ADA would 
create a perverse incentive for employers not to provide any disability 
coverage as part of their fringe benefits.133 Title VII does not harbor 
the same risk of perverse incentive because, unlike disability,134 a 
benefits plan cannot constitutionally differentiate treatment according 
to race, color, sex, or national origin.135 Thus, the employer does not 
risk Title VII challenges to its benefits plan from former employees. 
The overall purpose of both Title VII and the ADA is to draw 
protected classes of people into the workforce.136 Interpreting Title 
VII employees to encompass former employees may further such a 
goal; however, doing the same with respect to the ADA would impede 
it.137 Because this argument is unique to the ADA and does not stretc




                                                
138  
 
131 268 F.3d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 2001). 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 
1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a benefit plan that provided disparate coverage 
depending on whether disabilities were mental or physical “may or may not be an 
enlightened way to do things, but it was not discriminatory in the usual sense of the 
term”). 
135E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (finding an equal 
protection violation in a benefits plan that provided more favorable treatment to the 
spouses of male employees than to the spouses of female employees).  
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(7) (“the Nation’s proper 
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals”). 
137See id.  
138 Morgan, 268 F.3d at 458. 
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Reaching a sounder outcome, the Seventh Circuit’s approach 
to the Robinson inquiry illustrates an important point. The Supreme 
Court only considers an interpretation’s relation to the particular 
context, policy, and history of the statute at issue. While often 
Congress uses identical words to serve identical purposes, each piece 
of legislation is ultimately unique. Thus, while analogous decisions 
serve as guidance, each statute’s interpretation must also be unique.  
Likely a result of the three Johnson judges’ debate on this issue, the 
Eleventh Circuit vacated its opinion and will rehear the case en 
banc.139  
 
D. The Serwatka Inquiry: Necessary Considerations in Determining if 
the ADA Recognizes Mixed-Motive Causation 
 
The Serwatka case involves additional folds to the Title 
VII/ADA employee analysis. Akin to Gonzales and CNA Insurance, 
Foster serves as existing case law directing Serwatka to recognize 
mixed-motive causation in the ADA.140 Akin to Robinson, Gross 
serves as intervening Supreme Court precedent directing Serwatka to 
authorize only but-for causation if its rationale logically extends into 
the ADA context.141 Price Waterhouse creates the additional fold, 
serving as a Supreme Court case on which Foster relies and with 
which Gross clashes.142 Given this, Serwatka does not simply require 
a single assessment of existing circuit precedent in light of one 
analogous Supreme Court decision. Rather, the Serwatka analysis 
                                                 
139 Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). As a result 
of the defendant filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, the Johnson case has not yet been 
decided by an en banc panel. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 281 F.3d 1368, 1368 (11th 
Cir. Feb. 14, 2002) (stating that no decision will be rendered until the bankruptcy 
court grants relief from the automatic stay or the stay lapses). 
140 Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033–34 (7th Cir. 1999). 
141 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
142 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245 (1989). 
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mandates an inquiry into the Court’s two separate and entirely 
conflicting interpretations of the phrase “because of.”143  
At first glance, Serwatka would only need to consider Gross’s 
applicability because it is the Court’s most recent interpretation of 
“because of.”144 Where a court first interprets a given statute in one 
way but later adopts a different interpretation, the latter interpretation 
controls.145 The Court decided Gross over twenty years after Price 
Waterhouse; however, if it does not control the Serwatka decision, 
Price Waterhouse could extend to Serwatka in two ways. First, the 
general rule that only the most recent statutory interpretation is 
controlling is not implicated when the former interpretation stems 
from a separate statute.146 Gross did not overrule or replace Price 
Waterhouse outside of the ADEA context.147 If the Seventh Circuit 
determined that Gross did not to apply to the ADA context, Price 
Waterhouse remains as a separate source of guiding interpretation. 
Second, on a more practical level, if Gross does not control Serwatka, 
the Seventh Circuit would be bound to follow existing circuit 
precedent developed in the interim between Price Waterhouse and 
Gross because of the principles of horizontal stare decisis.148 Foster, 
the existing Seventh Circuit precedent, adopted the Price Waterhouse 
analysis in finding that the ADA does recognize mixed-motive 
causation.149 Thus, in deciding whether Gross applies, the Seventh 
                                                 
143 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(looking to both Price Waterhouse and Gross for guidance in determining whether 
the ADA authorizes mixed-motive claims). 
144 Gross, 129 S. Ct at 2350 (decided June 18, 2009). 
145 Carlos E. González, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing 
Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal 
Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447, 504 (2001); see, e.g., Hubbard v. United States, 514 
U.S. 695, 704 (1995) (trumping a prior interpretation of a statute).  
146 See also Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 704 (offering new interpretation of un-
amended statute, where the Court had previously interpreted the same statute with a 
contrary result).  
147 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 (simply noting that the Court’s ADEA 
interpretation is not controlled by Price Waterhouse).  
148 Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (emphasizing principles 
of horizontal stare decisis).  
149 Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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Circuit found itself in Serwatka as the referee between the two 
Supreme Court interpretations of “because of.” First, the Serwatka 
inquiry must determine if Gross’s rationale extends to the ADA 
context. Second, if Gross is inapplicable, the Seventh Circuit needs to 
revisit the propriety of applying the Price Waterhouse framework to 
the ADA.  
This Note examines which of the two Supreme Court 
precedents is most applicable to the ADA. Ultimately, it concludes 
that Serwatka was incorrectly decided and that the ADA does indeed 
allow recovery under mixed-motive causation. First, this Note argues 
that Gross’s ADEA rationale does not extend to the ADA context; 
thus, Serwatka incorrectly relied on Gross. Second, this Note argues 
that Price Waterhouse’s rationale in analyzing Title VII logically 
extends to the ADA context. Moreover, the 1991 Amendments did not 
undermine the continued viability of Price Waterhouse’s application 
to the ADA; thus, the Seventh Circuit should have continued to adhere 
to the Price Waterhouse analysis for ADA claims. Third, this Note 
examines the effect of the 2008 ADA Amendments, which exchanged 
the causation phrase “because of” with “on the basis of,” and 
concludes that this modification did not mark Congress’ intent to 
change causation under the ADA. Thus, the ADA should continue to 
recognize mixed-motive causation.   
 
III. IS GROSS APPLICABLE IN THE ADA CONTEXT? AN EXAMINATION OF 
GROSS’S RATIONALE. 
 
 Serwatka erred when it concluded that Gross mandated an 
overruling of Foster. Per Gross’s own instructions, one statute’s 
analysis should not leak to another without careful and critical 
examination.150 As circuit precedent indicates, this examination must 
be of the Supreme Court’s rationale in interpreting the statute as it 
did.151 First, Gross’s rationale in rejecting Price Waterhouse’s 
application to the ADEA does not extend to the ADA. For purposes of 
                                                 
150 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349. 
151 See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1111 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
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this Note, this rationale will be referred to as the “Legislative Intent 
Rationale.” Second, Gross’s vague rationale, used in its independent 
statutory analysis of the ADEA’s “because of” language, does not 
apply to the ADA. For purposes of this Note, this rationale will be 
referred to as the “Statutory Interpretation Rationale.” 
 
A. Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale is Inapplicable to the ADA. 
  
The Gross opinion begins with a discussion concerning Price 
Waterhouse’s applicability.152 The Court found that the 1991 
Amendments indicated that Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive 
interpretation could not apply to the ADEA.153 Because Congress 
considered both the ADEA and Title VII simultaneously but only 
explicitly provided for mixed-motive causation in Title VII, Congress 
meant for the ADEA to have a causation scheme different from that of 
Title VII.154 Gross decided it “must give effect to Congress’ 
choice.”155  
Serwatka oversimplified this rationale, stating that Gross held 
“that because the [ADEA] lacks the language found in Title VII 
expressly recognizing mixed-motive claims, such claims are not 
authorized by the ADEA.”156 In so doing, it diluted Gross’s 
examination of legislative history into a shallow test that simply looks 
to the absence or presence of specific language within each statute. 
While it is true that Gross ultimately held that Price Waterhouse could 
not extend to the ADEA because it lacked Title VII’s amended 
language, that holding was the product of a more developed 
analysis.157 The Court’s reasoning did not hinge on the mere inclusion 
or exclusion of certain statutory words; rather, Gross’s rationale 
hinged on congressional actions and considerations that preceded and 
                                                 
152 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.  
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 2350 n.3. 
156 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010). 
157 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (discussing the legislative history behind the 
exclusion of “motivating factor” in the ADEA). 
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caused the selection of statutory text.158 Quite simply, Gross’s 
rationale relied on the ADEA’s legislative intent.159    
This is the nub of the Seventh Circuit’s error in Serwatka. By 
failing to realize the importance that congressional intent played in the 
Gross analysis, it failed to compare the congressional intent of the 
ADA to the ADEA in order to determine if the Gross rationale should 
apply in Serwatka. Because congressional intent pertaining to the 
ADA’s causation scheme is notably similar to Title VII and notably 
dissimilar to the ADEA, Serwatka erred in concluding that Gross 
prohibited the Price Waterhouse framework to apply to the ADA.   
 Gross’s reason for not extending Price Waterhouse’s mixed-
motive causation framework to the ADEA was premised on the 
Court’s negative inference that Congress intended for the ADEA to 
feature a causation scheme different from that of Title VII.160 
Conversely, there is legislative history both within the 1991 
Amendments and outside of the Amendments that clearly evidences 
congressional intent that the ADA’s causation scheme should mirror 
Title VII’s mixed-motive causation. First, while the 1991 
Amendments were silent regarding the ADEA’s causation, they did 
speak to the ADA. Specifically, the Amendments provided for 
remedies to mixed-motive claims in Title VII’s remedies provision, 
which is cross-referenced by the ADA.161 Second, while Congress 
enacted Title VII and the ADEA before the Court decided Price 
Waterhouse, Congress enacted the ADA after that decision.162 Thus, 
when Congress included the phrase “because of” in the ADA’s 
causation provision, it did so with the understanding that such a phrase 
supported mixed-motive claims.163 Third, legislative history shows 
                                                 
158 Id.  
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(B)(i)–(ii), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). 
162 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (enacted in 1990). 
163 See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 
1996) (stating that the presumption that Congress legislates against the background 
of the law is “particularly compelling where, as here, Congress adopts operative 
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that careful debate occurred prior to the ADA’s enactment regarding 
whether the word “solely” should precede “because of.”164 The 
exclusion of this qualifier in the enacted statute reflects congressional 
intent for the ADA to authorize mixed-motive causation.165  
 
1. The ADA’s Cross-Reference to Title VII’s Powers, Remedies, 
and Procedures 
 Where the 1991 Amendments amended several provisions of 
the ADEA, including provisions relating to attorney’s fees and statutes 
of limitations, it was entirely silent on the causation provision of the 
ADEA.166 In contrast, the 1991 Amendments did alter the ADA’s 
causation framework.167 As Serwatka acknowledges, the Amendments 
to the Price Waterhouse decision were two-fold.168 They changed 
Title VII’s “because of” language to “motivating factor,” and they 




                                                                                                                  
169 Notably, the latter amendment modified the
powers, remedies, and procedures section of Title VII that is cross-
referenced by the ADA.170 Thus, the 1991 Amendments were not 
silent as to the ADA’s recognition of mixed-motive claims because 
they explicitly recognized remedies for them under the ADA.171  
 Serwatka focuses on the fact that the ADA’s substantive 
causation phrases do not explicitly provide for mixed-motive 
 
language to which the Supreme Court has recently given an authoritative 
interpretation in a similar context”). 
164 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, 85 (1990). 
165 Id.  
166 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009) (listing the 1991 
Amendment’s changes to the ADEA and noting that none of the modifications 
related to its causation provision). 
167 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075. 
168 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010). 
169 Id.; 105 Stat. at 1075. 
         170 See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (“the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in 
section 794(a) of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this 
subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability 
in violation of section 12132); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1). 
171 See id.  
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causation.172 Under this focus, the Seventh Circuit argues that the 
Amendments do not indicate congressional intent to allow mixed-
motive claims under the ADA because even though the 1991 
Amendments create ADA remedies for mixed-motive claims, they do 
not create ADA liability.173 This conclusion is unsound both because it 
is nonsensical and because it does not match the congressional intent 
behind creating this cross-reference in the ADA.  
First, the Seventh Circuit argument is based on the outlandish 
assumption that Congress would offer remedies to a claim that could 
not be created. Given that courts have long interpreted statutes so that 
each word is given operative effect,174 it is absurd to interpret a statute 
so that an entire remedy is inoperative. Where a statute explicitly 
provides remedies for a certain violation, courts should not construe 
that statute as to eliminate the plaintiff’s possibility of showing 
liability to activate such remedies.175 Though courts have expressed 
separation-of-powers concerns in substituting Congress’ enacted 
language with judicial judgment on what is sensible, the canon of 
construction that directs courts to construe statutes in a manner that 
avoids truly absurd results remains a legitimate interpretive tool.176   
Second, to give no effect to the ADA’s remedy for mixed-
motive claims, though it is specifically included within its cross-
referenced text, is to allow the ADA to fall out of step with Title VII. 
Such a result is in direct contradiction to the very purpose of creating 
the cross-reference in the first place.177 Though Congress could have 
simply inserted the language of Title VII into the ADA, it chose 
instead to create a cross-reference.178 Cross-references denote a 
definite legislative intent for one statute’s interpretation to continually 
                                                 
172 Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962. 
173 Id.  
174 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 
175 Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999).  
176 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989); 
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 557 n.2 (2007) (rejecting an 
interpretation of “air pollutants” in the Clean Air Act because it “defie[d] common 
sense”). 
177 H.R. REP. NO. 102-485, pt. 3, 48 (1990). 
178 See 42 U.S.C. § 12133. 
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align with that of another statute.179 “When Congress [merely] repeats 
the same word in a different statutory context, it is possible that 
Congress might have intended the context to alter the meaning of the 
word[s] . . . No such possibility exists with [cross-references].”180  
Legislative history of the ADA’s drafting reinforces this 
notion. Congress provided the cross-reference to guarantee that the 
ADA “currently and as amended in the future” followed Title VII.181 
Simply incorporating the language could freeze interpretation of one 
statute from extending to the other. The House Report that 
accompanies the ADA re-emphasized this goal, stating that “the 
purpose of the ADA is to “provide civil rights protection for people 
with disabilities that are parallel to those available to minorities and 
women.”182  
Moreover, Congress not only intended for a broad parallel 
between the ADA and Title VII, but Congress also specifically stated 
that the 1991 Amendments should not diverge the two statutory 
schemes.183 The House Report which supplemented the 1991 
Amendments explicitly stated that “other laws modeled after Title VII 
[should] be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title 
VII as amended by this Act.”184 The ADA cannot offer parallel 
protection to that of Title VII where courts construe one of the cross-
referenced remedies as dormant under the ADA.185 
Notably, the ADEA, the statute on which Gross relies, lacks a 
cross-reference to Title VII. Instead the ADEA cross-references the 
powers, remedies, and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act,, 
which itself lacks an explicit mixed-motive provision.186 Oddly, the 
                                                 
179 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 583 (2007)(Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
180 Id.  
         181 H.R. REP. NO. 102-485, pt. 3, 48 (1990). 
182 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, 48 (1990). 
183 Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 
549 (2009).   
184 Id.  
185 See id.  
186 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); 29 U.S.C. § 215. 
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Seventh Circuit notes this distinction in a footnote without inquiring 
into whether such a distinction between the ADA and ADEA should 
impact whether Gross extends to the ADA analysis.187 Indeed, there 
are meaningful similarities, specifically the cross-reference, between 
the ADA and Title VII that are lacking in the ADEA. While courts 
routinely refer to the ADA as a “sibling statute of Title VII,”188 they 
acknowledge that the ADEA is a “hybrid statute” that possesses 
characteristics similar to both Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.189 
 
2. The Timing of the ADA’s Enactment 
Indicia of legislative intent, separate from the 1991 
Amendments, also demonstrate that Congress specifically intended for 
the ADA to authorize mixed-motive claims. Unlike the ADEA, 
Congress enacted the ADA subsequent to the Price Waterhouse 
decision but prior to the 1991 Amendments.190 A canon of 
construction frequently used to determine legislative intent is that the 
“evaluation of congressional action must take into account its 
contemporary legal context.”191 When choosing to word the ADA’s 
causation provision with the phrase “because of,” Congress was fully 
aware of Supreme Court precedent interpreting that very language to 
authorize mixed-motive causation.192 If Congress had wished for the 
                                                 
187 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 n.2 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
188 Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1998). 
189 E.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995); 
Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 n.3 (8th Cir. 1982). 
190 29 U.S.C. § 621 (enacted in 1967); Pub. L. No. 102-166 (enacted in 1991); 
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (enacted in 1990).  
191 Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 230–31 (1996) (quoting 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698–99 (1979)). 
192 Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 546 (1988) (“It is always appropriate to 
assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law”); McNely 
v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996); see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE. L. J. 331, 343 (1991) (noting that Congress continually monitors Supreme 
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ADA to have a different effect than the Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting scheme, it is likely it would have enacted language that did 
not fall directly under Price Waterhouse’s interpretation.193 The same 
inferences cannot be drawn for the ADEA, which was enacted prior to 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “because of.” 
 
3. Legislative Debates on the Word “Solely” 
The ADA was closely modeled after the Rehabilitation Act, a 
statute which authorizes federal employees to recover for disability 
discrimination.194 Though Congress mirrored many concepts from this 
statute when drafting the ADA, it intentionally altered the 
Rehabilitation Act’s causation provision, which reads “solely by 
reason of.” 195 After careful debate, Congress specifically chose not to 
use the term “solely” in the ADA.196 The House Committee Report 
discussing the adoption of the ADA’s phrase “because of,” specifically 
states: “The Committee recognizes that the phrasing of section 202 in 
this legislation differs from section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] by 
virtue of the fact that the phrase ‘solely by reason of his or her 
handicap’ has been deleted.”197 Just as courts must give all modifying 
words operative effect, courts must also consider all omitted words in 
understanding the statute.198 Congress had debated explicitly 
providing for but-for causation, through the use of the word “solely.” 
                                                                                                                   
Court decisions interpreting statutes and that over half of the Court’s statutory 
decisions are examined in oversight hearings). 
193See id.  
194 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (noting that certain provisions 
of the ADA are “drawn almost verbatim” from the Rehabilitation Act). 
195 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
196 H.R. REP. NO. 485 pt. 2, 85 (1990). 
197 Id.  
198 Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (stating that courts should 
interpret all statutory words so that they are not superfluous); see Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995) (finding that the 
statutory word “harm” included environmental modification because it was not 
preceded by the qualifier “directly”); see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. 
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Its ultimate decision to omit “solely” indicates a decision not to 
require but-fo 199r causation.  
                                                
The fact that the ADEA’s “because of” language also lacks 
“solely” as a modifier is less compelling evidence that Congress 
intended to authorize mixed-motive claims. In contrast to the ADEA, 
it can concretely be shown that the ADA’s omission was thoroughly 
considered and purposefully done. Further, Serwatka need not 
consider the wisdom of the Gross decision as it applies to the ADEA; 
it need only determine if its logic applies to the ADA. Where there is 
clear and certain evidence of congressional intent that the ADA 
supports a mixed-motive claim, Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale 
does not apply, and Gross does not compel the Seventh Circuit to 
terminate any reliance on Price Waterhouse.  
 
B. Gross’s Statutory Interpretation Rationale is Inapplicable to the 
ADA Context. 
 
Serwatka’s extension of Gross seems to be based solely on 
Gross’s rejection of Price Waterhouse.200 After incorrectly extending 
Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that Gross mandated but-for causation in all statutes lacking the 
“motivating factor” language.201 However, Gross conducted a separate 
statutory analysis of the phrase “because of” in order to come to the 
conclusion that the ADEA phrase mandates but-for causation.202 Thus, 
in order for the Seventh Circuit to rely on Gross in holding that 
ADA’s “because of” language necessitates but-for causation, it would 
need to independently examine Gross’s ADEA Statutory 
Interpretation Rationale to determine if it extends to the ADA context. 
Following a “careful and critical examination,”203 this Note argues 
that, like Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale, its Statutory 
Interpretation Rationale also should not extend to the ADA context.  
 
199 See also id.  
200 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010). 
201 Id.  
202 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
203 Id. at 2349. 
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Gross seems to base the majority of its justification for but-for 
causation on the finding that Congress intended for Title VII and the 
ADEA to have different causation provisions.204 In a subsequent 
statutory analysis of the phrase, Gross uses hurried and vague 
rationale to conclude that “because of” mandates but-for causation.205 
First, Gross provided a list of synonyms for “because of” in an effort 
to find the phrase’s plain meaning.206 “Because of” equates to phrases 
such as “by reason of” or “on account of,” all of which, Gross 
contends, mandate but-for causation.207 This analysis is unpersuasive 
because, just like “because of,” phrases such as “by reason of” and “on 
account of” also lack a modifier that would relieve the phrase of its 
existing ambiguity. Indeed, the Rehabilitation Act’s causation 
provision provides that a government employer cannot discriminate 
“solely by reason of a disability.”208 If the phrase “by reason of” 
independently supported but-for causation, it would have been 
superfluous for Congress to include “solely” in the Rehabilitation 
Act.209  
Gross’s second statutory analysis argument is equally weak. 
Gross argues that the default rule in burden-allocation should apply to 
ADEA plaintiffs; thus, the ADEA requires but-for causation.210 
Serwatka echoes this argument and states, “unless a statute [explicitly] 
provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the 
plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”211 Gross and 
Serwatka overlook the fact that often, courts poke exceptions into this 
default rule in order to prevent unjust or inequitable results.212 In 
situations where there is a significant variance in access to information 
                                                 
204 See id. at 2349–50. 
205 See id. at 2350–51. 
206 Id. at 2350. 
207 Id.  
208 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
209 See id.  
210 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351. 
211 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2010). 
212 Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the 
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or plaintiffs are in a particularly difficult position to meet their burden, 
courts have created a variety of alternative doctrines to mitigate the 
harshness of causation.213 When the traditional burden-allocation to 
the plaintiff is unfair or particularly difficult to meet, as it is within the 
context of employment discrimination statutes,214 it has been 
recognized that the burdens may be adjusted to accommodate 
equitable concerns.215 
Gross overemphasizes how general this rule is and fails to 
recognize that Price Waterhouse “d[id] not traverse new ground” in 
altering the burden-allocation of plaintiffs and defendants in the 
antidiscrimination context.216 In fact, when looking at other remedial 
statutes, the Court has likewise adjusted the relative burdens between 
parties to increase the scope of the statute’s coverage.217 Courts have 
construed the National Labor Relations Act,218 the Equal Pay Act,219 
the Pregnancy and Discrimination Act,220 and § 1983221 as all 
requiring plaintiffs to only meet the burden of showing that their 
protected trait or activity was a substantial, albeit not exclusive, cause 
                                                 
213 Id. 
214 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (noting the 
difficulty in obligating a Title VII plaintiff to “identify the precise causal role played 
by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she 
challenges”).  
215 Kessler, supra note 212, at 498. 
216 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248; see Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351.  
217 Id. at 250 (referring to the court’s interpretation of causation under 
employee speech doctrines, National Labor Relations Act, Equal Pay Act, and 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, all of which allow for mixed-motive causation).  
218 Loparex LLC v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 591 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 
2009) (stating that Board must make a showing that anti-union animus was a 
motivating factor in the challenged employment decision before the burden then 
switches to the employer). 
219 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974) (holding that 
employer, not employee, must prove that the actual disparity in pay is not linked to 
sex under the Equal Pay Act).  
220 Hayes v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984).  
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of the defendant’s actions. Given these many exceptions, Gross’s 
default rule rationale should not be extended.  
Third, Gross attempts to bolster its statutory construction with 
a policy consideration, stating that burden-shifting frameworks are 
difficult to apply.222 To support this notion, Gross cites two circuit 
court opinions, both of which were then over fifteen years old and one 
of which was a dissenting opinion.223 This dated precedent is 
undermined by the many examples of statutes that do implement a 
burden-shifting framework.224 Additionally, Serwatka itself illustrates 
that the mixed-motive framework can be successfully applied, as 
evidenced from the case’s clearly-worded jury instructions and 
responses.225 Moreover, it is inappropriate to root statutory analysis in 
a court’s own views of substantive policy.226 Whether the difficulties 
in applying a burden-shifting framework outweigh the benefits of 
increased statutory protection is a question of balance that the 
legislative branch is most equipped to decide.227 Substantive policy “is 
a question for lawmakers, not law interpreters.”228 If it is inappropriate 
for the Supreme Court to consider its own policy preferences, it is 
                                                 
222 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009). 
223 Id. (relying on Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir. 
1992); Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assoc., Inc., 924 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting)). 
224 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
225See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d, 957, 958 (7th Cir. 
2010). The jury was presented with two special verdict questions. First, “[d]id 
defendant terminate plaintiff due to its perception that she was substantially limited 
in her ability to walk or stand?” Id. Second, “[w]ould defendant have discharged 
plaintiff if it did not believe she was substantially limited in her ability to walk or 
stand, but everything else remained the same?” Id. The jury answered “yes” to both 
questions. Id.  
226 Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 
77, 98 n.14 (1981) (quoting U.S. v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511–13 (1954)) (The 
legislature is most equipped to determine policy because “[t]he selection of . . . 
policy which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations 
that must be weighed and appraised”). 
227 Id.  
228 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 259 
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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especially inappropriate for an intermediate appellate court to infer 
policy preferences in interpreting the causation scheme of the ADA—
especially where, as discussed supra in Section III.A., legislative 
history clearly suggests that Congress preferred that the ADA 
authorize mixed-motive causation. Thus, this policy rationale should 
not extend to Serwatka. 
Overall, this nebulous reasoning does not compel the circuit 
courts to adopt similar approaches in other statutory contexts because 
it fails to provide a clear and applicable analogy to the ADA context. 
Lacking persuasive reasoning even within the ADEA context, Gross’s 
hurried statutory analysis should not be extended to the ADA, where 
such an application would be one of circuit discretion rather than one 
of compulsory stare decisis.229 Thus, in addition to the Legislative 
Intent Rationale, Gross’s Statutory Interpretation Rationale does not 
extend to the ADA with equal force. 
 
IV. IS PRICE WATERHOUSE APPLICABLE TO THE ADA? AN 
EXAMINATION OF PRICE WATERHOUSE’S RATIONALE AND CONTINUING 
VIABILITY. 
 
 Because Gross’s two rationales cannot be extended to the 
ADA context to preclude reliance on Price Waterhouse or to mandate 
but-for causation, the Seventh Circuit should have recognized mixed-
motive claims under the ADA. This result is legally sound both 
technically and doctrinally. Technically, without disruption from 
Gross, application of stare decisis instructs the Seventh Circuit to 
continue to apply Foster.230 Doctrinally, Price Waterhouse, the case 
on which Foster relies, uses rationale in interpreting the phrase 
“because of” that applies with equal force to the ADA. This section 
will first establish that Price Waterhouse’s rationale is both legally 
sound and fully applicable to the ADA context. Second, this section 
will establish that the subsequent congressional amendments in the 
                                                 
229 See supra, Section II.B. 
230 See Chi. Truck Drivers v. Steinberg, 32 F.3d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(stating the importance of stare decisis within the Seventh Circuit). 
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1991 Amendments in no way depleted Price Waterhouse’s application 
to circuit court ADA decisions.  
 
A. The Rationale Behind Price Waterhouse’s Title VII Statutory 
Interpretation Applies with Equal Force to the ADA. 
 
The Price Waterhouse holding rested entirely on statutory 
analysis of the phrase “because of.”231 Simply stated by the Court, 
“[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-
for causation’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”232 In its statutory 
analysis, the Court found four independent rationales that justified 
why Title VII’s “because of” language supported mixed-motive 
claims.233 Each of these four reasons applies with equal force to the 
ADA.  
First, the Court noted that but-for causation was an 
inappropriate scheme given the present tense of Title VII’s operative 
verbs.234 Of all the textual components of a statute, verbs are most 
likely to affect the legal outcome of a case.235 Courts have explicitly 
considered verb tense as a reliable indicator of the statute’s 
application.236 For example, in Barrett v. United States, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Federal Gun Control Act, which provides that it 
is unlawful for certain convicted criminals “to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce.”237 The defendant was a Kentuckian who went to a 
                                                 
231 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989). 
232 Id.  
233 Id. at 240–251. 
234 Id. at 240. 
235 Robert C. Farrell, Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern 
Legal Opinions, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2008). 
236 Id.; see United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992); Barrett v. United 
States, 423 U.S. 212, 216–17 (1976); but see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (finding that employees who can correct their impairment 
through mitigating measures do not have a disability because of the present tense 
verb form of “substantially limits,” a holding which Congress overrode in the 2008 
ADA Amendments).   
237 423 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added); see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
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local shop to purchase a weapon that had been originally shipped from 
Massachusetts.238 The defendant argued that the scope of the Federal 
Gun Control Act did not extend to his case because the Act meant only 
to restrict interstate gun trafficking and did not cover sales by local 
merchants to local residents.239 However, the Court noted that the 
language regarding the foreign commerce was in present perfect tense, 
denoting an action that was already completed.240 Thus, the 
defendant’s local purchase still fell into the purview of the statute, 
even if the interstate gun trafficking did not occur at the moment he 
made his weapon purchase.241   
Price Waterhouse made an analogous argument regarding the 
operative verbs in Title VII. Specifically, Title VII states that “[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s [protected trait.]”242 The present tense of the proscribed 
verbs indicates that courts must consider the employer’s actions at the 
moment they were made in order to discern whether the employer has 
violated the statute.243 This inquiry accommodates mixed-motive 
causation, which requires only a narrow analysis—whether the 
employer considered an employee’s protected trait at the time of the 
adverse employment action.244 On the other hand, but-for causation is 
“a hypothetical construct,” forcing courts to reason outside of the 
mixed-motive claim’s narrow analysis.245 Rather than concluding 
whether an employer’s decision violated Title VII at the moment it 
was made, but-for causation forces courts to hypothetically reconstruct 
the factual scenario after it has been completed and determine if the 
employer would have made the same decision without the illegal 
                                                 
238 Barrett, 432 U.S. at 213–214. 
239 Id. at 216. 
240 Id. at 216–17. 
241 Id.  
242 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (referencing § 
703(a)(1)). 
243 Id. at 241. 
244 Id. at 240. 
245 Id.  
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consideration.246 Thus, just as in Barrett, where the court’s 
interpretation allowed the proscribed act to be already completed, in 
order for Title VII’s language to support but-for causation, its verbs 
would need to be in present perfect tense.247 Because Title VII did not 
read, “it shall be unlawful for an employer to have failed or refused to 
hire or to have discharged any individual because of their protected 
characteristic,” Price Waterhouse correctly concluded that the 
provision did not require but-for causation.248  
This statutory construction applies with equal force to the 
ADA, which also features verbs drafted in present tense, rather than 
present perfect tense. Rather than stating that no employer shall have 
discriminated against a qualified individual because of their disability, 
the ADA states that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability . . .”249 Moreover, the 
statute then fleshes out what constitutes discrimination, listing the 
proscribed actions as present tense participles.250 Specifically, 
discrimination includes “limiting, segregating, or classifying a job 
applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities 
or status of such applicant or employee, . . . utilizing [discriminatory] 
standards, criteria, or methods of administration, . . . excluding or 
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits . . .” 251 Like Barrett and 
Price Waterhouse, the present tense of the operative verbs in the ADA 
require courts to determine if a statutory violation occurred at the 
moment the adverse employment action was made.252 Courts cannot 
meet this requirement through a but-for causation analysis; thus, 
mixed-motive causation is the most appropriate interpretation.253  
Second, Price Waterhouse reasoned that because Title VII’s 
causation language said “because” and not “solely because,” plaintiffs 
                                                 
246 Id.  
247 See id. at 241; Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 216–17 (1976). 
248 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.  
249 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). 
250 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). 
251 Id. (emphasis added).  
252 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241; Barrett, 423 U.S. at 216–17. 
253 See id.  
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need not show but-for causation.254 Just as each included word in a 
statute should be deemed to have operative effect, any missing words 
should also be considered to be purposefully excluded.255 Moreover, 
specific legislative history exists to show that Congress purposefully 
omitted the word “solely,” thus bolstering the assumption that the 
legislature did not intend for Title VII to require but-for causation.256 
Price Waterhouse noted that Congress had considered including the 
word “solely” in its drafting deliberations but ultimately declined to do 
so.257 Where Congress purposefully chose to omit a qualifying word, 
the Court seemed to reason that it was improper to read that very word 
into the statute’s construction.258  
This rationale comfortably extends to the ADA context. As 
discussed supra in Section III.A.3., the ADA also lacks the qualifying 
word “solely” in its causation phrase. Moreover, just like the drafting 
deliberations of Title VII, Congress similarly discussed and debated 
preceding the ADA phrase “because of” with solely, but declined to do 
so. Thus, the Court’s reasoning that it should not read into a statute a 
word that legislators consciously omitted applies to the ADA context.   
Third, Price Waterhouse supported its Title VII statutory 
analysis by reference to § 2000e-2(e), which shields employers from 
liability for considering gender in an employment decision if gender is 
a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of the particular business or enterprise.”259 Where 
Congress explicitly carves out a narrow exception in allowing 
employers to consider gender, it follows that any other considerations 
of gender that do not fall within the exception are proscribed, whether 
they are paired with legitimate considerations or standing alone.260 
Again, this reasoning applies with equal force to the ADA 
context. Just as Title VII contains explicit statutory exceptions, the 
                                                 
254 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241. 
255 See id.  
256 Id. at 241 n.7. 
257 Id.  
258 See id. at 241. 
259 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242. 
260 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242. 
 394
39
Sues: Gross'ed Out: The Seventh Circuit's Over-Extension of <em>Gross v
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 5, Issue 2                         Spring 2010 
 
ADA also contains explicit exceptions that permit employers to 
consider an employee’s disability. For example, the ADA removes 
liability from an employer for using a screening test that tends to 
screen out people with disabilities where the test is “job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be 
accomplished by reasonable accommodation.”261 This clause raises 
the same inference that Price Waterhouse made: that “in all oth
circumstances, a person’s [disability] may not be considered.”
er 
                                                
262 
Fourth, the court relied on logic and equitable principles in 
construing what Congress intended “because of” to mean, stating that 
“[w]e need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we 
interpret a statute.”263 Surely, the Court reasoned, Congress did not 
intend for Title VII plaintiffs to endure the impossible task of 
ascertaining the precise causal role of an employer’s actions by 
detangling the employer’s legitimate and illegitimate 
considerations.264 If plaintiffs can show, at the least, that the defendant 
did consider factors prohibited by statute, then they have shown that 
the defendant is a wrong-doer in the situation.265 Though to what 
extent the employer will be liable is still not clear, it is fair that the 
wrongdoer bear the difficult task of separating its own motives, should 
it attempt to show that it would have made the same decision even 
without considering the illegitimate factor.266 Common sense and 
equity dictate that if someone needs to “bear the risk that the influence 
of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated,” it should be the 
defendant because “[it] knowingly created the risk and because the 
risk was created not by innocent activity but by [its] own 
wrongdoing.”267 These equitable concerns are not unique to Title VII 
and should extend to the ADA.  
 
261 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
262 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242. 
263 Id. at 241.  
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 249.  
266 Id.  
267 Id. at 250; Kessler, supra note 212, at 498 (stating that when causation is 
particularly difficult to prove, “the malfeasor should suffer the inequity”). 
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 In sum, the rationale of Price Waterhouse’s Title VII decision 
applies with equal force to the ADA context268 and thus can be 
extended to the ADA following a “careful and critical 
examination.”269 Not only had Price Waterhouse looked to language 
identical to that of the ADA, but more importantly, each of its 
independent rationales in support of mixed-motive causation neatly fit 
within the context of the disability discrimination statute.  
ther 
ve or 
                                                
 
B. The 1991 Amendments Did Not Undermine the Instructive Value of 
Price Waterhouse’s Interpretation of the Phrase “Because Of” 
  
Viewing Price Waterhouse in isolation, Section IV.A. 
discussed the applicability of  that Supreme Court decision to the 
ADA. Of course, before comfortably extending Price Waterhouse to 
the ADA, the Seventh Circuit would need to consider the continuing 
viability of this decision in light of the subsequent 1991 
Amendments.270 Gross did not indicate that the 1991 Amendments 
served to undermine Price Waterhouse as good law.271 Rather, 
Gross’s focus on the 1991 Amendments related to their portrayal of 
legislative intent regarding the ADEA only.272 Serwatka, on the o
hand, seemed to reason that Price Waterhouse lost all persuasi
instructive value following the 1991 Amendments; it essentially 
concluded that the phrase “because of” could never create mixed-
motive causation.273 However, Supreme Court law, specifically Price 
 
268 E.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (“Although the ADA includes no explicit mixed-motive provision, a 
number of other circuits have held that the mixed-motive analysis available in the 
Title VII context applies equally to cases brought under the ADA”). 
269 See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).  
270 See Hunter v. Valley View Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating 
that it was necessary to reconsider the propriety of applying Price Waterhouse to a 
different statutory context in light of Gross’s comments on the 1991 Amendments).  
271 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348 (stating only that Price Waterhouse does not 
control the construction of the ADEA). 
272 Id. at 2349. 
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Waterhouse, demonstrates that “because of” can create mixed-motive 
causation.274 The Seventh Circuit erred in ignoring this instructive 
precedent. The 1991 Amendments did not impair Price Waterhouse’s 
continued viability; they strengthened it.  
Clearly stated, the purpose of the 1991 Amendments was to 
restore the protection afforded to employees under antidiscrimination 
statutes, which had been eroded by Supreme Court statutory 
construction.275 In reaching this purpose, Congress responded to 
various Supreme Court decisions, including Ward’s Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio276 and Price Waterhouse.277 Congress dissected these two 
opinions into segments, codifying the aspects of the legal precedent 
that afforded protection to employees and overriding the aspects of the 
opinions which over-extended the employer’s interests to the 
detriment of a stringent antidiscrimination policy.278 In 1989, the 
Court in Ward’s Cove followed Griggs v. Duke Power Co.279 in 
recognizing that Title VII plaintiffs can recover under disparate impact 
claims where employers utilize facially-neutral employment practices 
that have a disadvantageous impact on women or minority groups.280 
It departed from Griggs as to the defendant’s burden in these claims 
by allowing an employer to escape liability if it could carry its burden 
of producing evidence of a business justification for the challenged 
employment practice.281  
                                                 
274 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989). 
275 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (stating that one of the 
purposes of the 1991 Amendments was “to respond to recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to 
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination”). 
276 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 1074. 
277 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
278 § 107(a)–(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codifying mixed-motive causation and 
eliminating defendant’s affirmative defense); § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074 (explicitly 
providing for disparate impact claims and heightening the defendant’s burden in 
escaping liability under such claims). 
279 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
280 Ward’s Cove, 490 U.S. at 658. 
281 Id. at 660. 
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The 1991 Amendments reacted to this decision by affirming 
the aspects of the opinion that increased the scope of Title VII’s 
protection,282 while overriding the aspects of the opinion that 
narrowed its scope.283 Accordingly, the Amendments codified Ward’s 
Cove and Griggs’s authorization for Title VII’s disparate impact 
claims by explicitly providing for such liability,284 but they restored 
protection to  employees by overriding Ward’s Cove’s holding th




                                                
285 Instead of the Wa
Cove burden, which only required the defendant to produce evid
showing a business justification,286 the Amendments provide for a 
more stringent burden on the defendant, namely both production and 
persuasion of a business necessity.287 Thus, under the 1991 
Amendments’ modification of disparate impact doctrine, courts are 
more likely to find a Title VII employer liable once a plaintiff 
establishes the occurrence of discriminatory practices.288 
In complete parallel, Congress reacted to the Price Waterhouse 
decision by codifying the aspects of the holding that afforded 
protection to the plaintiffs289 and overriding the aspects of the holding 
 
282 § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)) (“An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established . . .”).  
283 § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (a disparate impact claim is established if “a complaining party 
demonstrates [a disparate impact on a protected class] and the respondent fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity”). 
284 § 105(a). 
285 § 105(a)(i). 
286 See 490 U.S. at 659. 
287 See § 105(a)(i). 
288 See id.   
289 § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) 
(“Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice”). 
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that narrowed Title VII’s protective scope.290 Price Waterhouse had 
considered two arguments: Hopkins had contended that an employer 
violates Title VII any time it considers, solely or partially, a protected 
trait in making an employment decision; Price Waterhouse contended 
that it was the plaintiff’s burden to show that her protected trait was 
the but-for cause of the challenged action.291 In light of these 
competing interests, the Court held that a “plaintiff who shows that an 
impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse 
employment decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the 
burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the 
absence of the unlawful motive.”292 Finding that this conclusion struck 
the appropriate balance between an employee’s protection and an 
employer’s free choice, the Court stated that “as often happens, the 
truth lies somewhere in between.”293 The 1991 Amendments disagreed 
with this sentiment and repositioned the “truth” in favor of employee 
protection.294  
In its re-balancing of interests, Congress codified the aspect of 
Price Waterhouse that accommodated employee interests by explicitly 
providing that Title VII plaintiffs can meet their burden through a 
showing of mixed-motive causation.295 On the other hand, the 1991 
Amendments overrode the Price Waterhouse holding that equipped 
employers with an affirmative defense to mixed-motive claims.296 
Specifically, the 1991 Amendments recognize that any time an 
                                                 
290 § 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(B)(i)–(ii) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 
703(m) and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may 
grant declaratory relief . . . and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly 
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 703(m); and (ii) shall not 
award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, 
promotion, or payment”). 
291 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1989). 
292 Id. at 250. 
293 Id. at 238. 
294 See § 107(b). 
295 § 107(a). 
296 § 107(b). 
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employer considers an impermissible characteristic, they have violated 
federal law; however, where an employer can show that they would 
have made the same decision absent the illegal consideration, its 
obligations are substantially lowered.297 The effect of this amendment 
is both symbolic and practical. Symbolically, Congress has made clear 
that any time an employer considers a factor prohibited by Title VII, it 
has committed a violation.298 Practically, it ensures that plaintiffs can 
always collect attorney’s fees if they show that their employer 
discriminated against them.299    
Clearly, the aspects of the Ward’s Cove and Price Waterhouse 
decisions, which afforded employer’s discretion at the expense of 
employee protection, are no longer good law as a result of the 
superseding statute.300 They were unequivocally overridden by the 
1991 Act.301 However, Congress did not call into question the Court’s 
holdings that enlarged the protective scope of Title VII; rather, 
Congress endorsed their instructive value through codification. Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, noted this 
exact point in his dissent in Gross:  
 
[T]he fact that Congress endorsed this Court’s interpretation of 
the “because of” language in Price Waterhouse (even as it 
rejected the employer’s affirmative defense to liability) 
provides all the more reason to adhere to that decision’s 
motivating-factor test. Indeed, Congress emphasized in passing 
the 1991 Act that the motivating-factor test was consistent with 
its original intent in enacting Title VII.302  
                                                 
297 Id. 
298 See § 107(b). 
299 Id. 
300 Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1376 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that the 1991 Act overruled Ward’s Cove’s lenient defendant burden); 
Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. Red Arrow Div., 982 F.2d 892, 899 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1993) (noting that the 1991 Act overruled Price Waterhouse’s affirmative defense 
following a plaintiff’s showing of mixed-motive).  
301 See id.  
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In parallel reasoning to the Gross dissent, following the 1991 
Amendments, courts have continued to follow the codified segments 
of the Court’s Title VII disparate impact precedent in other Title VII 
cases303 and to extend it to other statutory contexts.304 For example, in 
Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, the Supreme Court held that 
Griggs’ recognition of disparate impact claims survived the 1991 
Amendments when it questioned whether the ADEA authorized 
recovery under these claims.305 Smith could have applied a reasoning 
akin to Gross’s Legislative Intent Rationale.306 In fact, the Court 
acknowledged that the 1991 Amendments had explicitly provided for 
disparate impact claims under Title VII, while remaining silent as to 
such claims under the ADEA.307 However, Smith did not reason, as 
Gross did, that this legislative action indicated that the ADEA should 
not recognize disparate impact claims.308 Instead, Smith correctly 
noted that Congress’ codification of a Court’s interpretation does not 
undermine future reliance on that decision.309 Explicitly stated, the 
Amendments serve to provide “additional protections against unlawful 
discrimination,” “additional remedies under Federal law,” and an 
“expan[sion of] the scope of relevant civil rights statutes.”310 To 
reason that the Court’s employee-friendly interpretation is no longer 
                                                 
303 See Cota v. Tucson Police Dep’t, 783 F. Supp. 458, 472 n.14 (D. Ariz. 
1992) (“The 1991 Act, however, leaves unchanged the standards for a prima facie 
case. Thus, under Title VII, both before and after its recent amendment, the prima 
facie inquiry in a disparate impact case will be identical”). 
304 Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (concluding that 
the ADEA recognizes disparate impact cases under Ward’s Cove’s pre-1991 
interpretation); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 (2003) (noting that the 
ADA recognizes disparate impact cases and citing to Ward’s Cove in so doing). 
305 Smith, 544 U.S. at 237. 
306 Id. at 240. 
307 Id. (“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the coverage of Title 
VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination”).   
308 Compare Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 129 S. Ct 2343, 2349 (2009), with 
Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
309 Smith, 544 U.S. at 234, 240 (noting that both Griggs and Ward’s Cove are 
“precedent of compelling importance” and applying them to the Title VII context).  
310 Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2–3, 105 Stat. at 1071.  
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good law because of Congress’ codification is to contradict Congress’ 
very purpose in enacting the 1991 Amendments.311  
Interestingly, Smith extended Ward’s Cove much further than 
Serwatka would need to extend Price Waterhouse in order to authorize 
ADA mixed-motive causation. In addition to relying on Ward’s 
Cove’s bare recognition of disparate impact claims, Smith also applied 
Ward’s Cove’s lenient employer’s burden, which the 1991 
Amendments explicitly overruled as to the Title VII context.312 In 
recognizing mixed-motive causation, Serwatka need not rely on the 
repudiated aspects of the Price Waterhouse decision; an ADA 
defendant’s mitigated liability is directly controlled by the ADA’s 
cross-reference to the 1991 Amendment.313 Instead, Serwatka would 
only rely on the aspect of the Price Waterhouse decision that Congress 
codified.314 If the Supreme Court has found that a clearly repudiated 
provision of Ward’s Cove could apply to other statutory contexts, 
surely Serwatka should have held that Price Waterhouse’s 
congressionally-endorsed mixed-motive framework could apply to the 
ADA.315  
Of course, a fair argument can be made that if Congress truly 
agreed that the phrase “because of” supported mixed-motive 
causation, amending that language to “motivating factor” was 
superfluous—and when legislating, every action of Congress is 
                                                 
311 See id. 
312 Smith, 540 U.S. at 240 (“Ward’s Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title 
VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA”). Smith is an example of 
using what scholars refer to as “shadow precedent,” where courts find judicial 
interpretation of statutory language controlling with respect to any application not 
explicitly addressed by the congressional override. Widiss, supra note 183, at 532. 
Widiss argues that this practice is controversial because it thwarts congressional will 
and diminishes the predictability and fairness of stare decisis. Id. at 560–01. If 
Serwatka had relied on Price Waterhouse’s bare recognition of mixed-motive 
causation, it would not have engaged in this controversial practice because Congress 
did not override that aspect of the Price Waterhouse holding. See id. at 532. 
313 42 U.S.C. § 12133. 
314 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075.  
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intentional and operative.316 However, Congress codifies Court 
precedent frequently without any intent to correct it.317 In so doing, it 
merely solidifies or clarifies existing precedent.318 This practice does 
not cast any doubt on the Court’s decision.319  
Price Waterhouse, in establishing mixed-motive causation, did 
so in a splintered and uncertain fashion.320 Four Justices joined a 
plurality opinion, Justice White and Justice O’Connor separately 
concurred in the judgment, and three Justices dissented.321 While six 
Justices ultimately agreed that the burden of persuasion shifts to the 
defendant if a Title VII plaintiff shows that discrimination was a 
“motivating” or “substantial” factor in the employer’s decision, it 
remained unclear whether plaintiffs, in meeting their burden, needed 
to present direct evidence of discrimination.322   
 Given these fractures in the Court’s voice, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Congress meant only to clarify that the statutory 
language, “because of,” does indeed support a mixed-motive causation 
scheme.323 Moreover, this codification guaranteed that Price 
                                                 
316 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). 
317 E.g., United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
that congressional reaction to Hughey v. U.S. codified rather than undermined the 
Hughey decision and recognizing that congressional codification of a court’s 
statutory interpretation is “by no means an unusual tack for Congress to take”); see 
Eskridge, supra note 192, at 424–27 (app. I) (noting seven examples from the 100th 
and 101st Congressional sessions where Congress amended statutes with the purpose 
of clarifying the statutes’ interpretations rather than overriding them). 
318 Id.  
319 Id.  
320 Gross, 129 S. Ct at 2347 (listing the specifics of the “splintered” Price 
Waterhouse decision).   
321 Id.  
322 See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
         323 While the 1991 Amendment’s legislative history explicitly states that it is 
overturning certain Court holdings, the history shows that the Amendments only 
clarified Price Waterhouse’s recognition of mixed-motive causation. See 137 CONG. 
REC. E3832 (1991) (statement of Rep. Dixon). For example, California 
Representative Dixon stated that the “motivating factor” amendment is a 
“compromise [that] makes clear that any employer may not make an employment 
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Waterhouse’s interpretation was no longer susceptible to the Court’s 
reexamination or modification.324 The risk of Court reexamination 
seemed likely, given the inter-opinion disagreement; a codification 
enabled Congress to definitively end the debate with a clear, single 
voice.325 In sum, the 1991 Amendments did not vitiate the continued 
applicability of Price Waterhouse’s instructive value. Thus, the 
Seventh Circuit should rely on its rationale in authorizing mixed-
motive claims under the ADA.  
 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE 2008 ADA AMENDMENTS: EXCHANGING 
“BECAUSE OF” WITH “ON THE BASIS OF” 
 
 Judge Rovner acknowledged that her decision in Serwatka did 
not take into consideration the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.326 
Though these amendments have been in effect since January 1, 2009, 
the Seventh Circuit decided Serwatka under the ADA’s original 
language because Serwatka was discharged in 2004 and the trial 
occurred in 2008, all before the amendments took effect.327 The 
Amendments, among other things, modify the ADA’s causation 
phrase, replacing “because of” with a prohibition against 
discriminating against an individual “on the basis of” a disability.328 In 
a footnote, Judge Rovner stated that, “[w]hether ‘on the basis of’ 
means anything different from ‘because of,’ and whether this or any 
other revision to the statute matters in terms of the viability of a 
mixed-motive claim under the ADA, are not questions that we need to 
consider in this appeal.”329 As time passes, the Seventh Circuit is 
                                                 
324 Widiss, supra note 183, at 520. 
325 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162, 2170 (2002) (“[E]xplicit phrasing can offer a more precise statutory 
resolution, often one that is unavailable as a legal interpretation, and thus reflect 
political preferences more accurately than judicial guesses of what the legislature 
would have done”).  
326 Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 n.1 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
327 Id.  
328 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009). 
329 Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962 n.1. 
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certain to face this analysis. This section will argue that “on the basis 
of” supports a mixed-motive claim.330  
 Seemingly, “on the basis of” is the equivalent of “because of;” 
thus, the arguments presented in Sections III and IV relating to the 
extension of Gross and Price Waterhouse also apply to the 2008 ADA 
Amendments. However, an independent statutory analysis of this 
phrase is useful because the phrase “on the basis of” presents fresh 
statutory language that the Court has not yet interpreted in an 
antidiscrimination employment statute.  
The first step in analyzing a statute is always to look to the text 
to determine whether the language is plain and unambiguous.331 A 
closer look into this phrase indicates that it may offer greater 
justification for mixed-motive causation than did the phrase “because 
of.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “basis” as “a fundamental 
principle, and underlying fact or condition.”332 An underlying fact or 
condition suggests a non-exclusive causal role because for a fact to be 
underlying, it must have a relation to another fact. Thus, where an 
employer acts “on the basis of disability,” it need not act exclusively 
because of the disability. Rather, the disability need only form one part 
of the decision or, like in Title VII, be a motivating factor of the 
decision.333  
Though the definition of “basis” suggests that this amended 
causation phrase supports mixed-motive causation, the argument is far 
from conclusive. “On the basis of” shares the same problem of 
ambiguity as “because of.”334 Both phrases necessitate a preceding 
                                                 
330 Few courts have addressed the statutory analysis of the amended phrase “on 
the basis of.” A New York District Court provided a cursory analysis of this issue 
and concluded that despite the change in statutory analysis, it would follow Second 
Circuit precedent to find that “because of” allowed mixed-motive claims. Doe v. 
Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
331 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
332 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009). 
333 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989). 
334 This ambiguity is easily reflected by the fact that the Supreme Court 
conducted independent analyses of the phrase “because of” used in similar contexts 
and came up with two conflicting, plausible results. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
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qualifier in order to allow only one plausible interpretation.335 Had 
Congress stated that an employer could not act “solely because of” an 
employee’s disability or “solely on the basis of” an employee’s 
disability, then a court’s interpretation would necessarily need to find 
but-for causation.336 On the other hand, Congress likewise did not 
precede these causation phrases with a qualifier such as “partially” that 
would explicitly provide mixed-motive causation.  
Indeed, in interpreting antidiscrimination statutes, the Court 
has placed weighty emphasis on the presence or absence of a qualifier 
to the statutory language.337 For example, in Robinson, the Court 
found the use of the word “employees” in Title VII to be ambiguous 
because it was not preceded by a qualifier such as “current” or 
“former.”338 In light of this ambiguity, the Court selected the 
interpretation that would match the broad, remedial purposes of Title 
VII and increased its coverage; thus, the Court determined employees 
to mean both current and former employees.339  
Under Robinson, the ambiguity of “on the basis of” should be 
determined by reference to the broader context of the statute as a 
whole.340 Like Title VII, the ADA features a very broad goal.341 The 
overall purposes of the ADA include to “provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities; . . . to provide clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination . . . ; and . 
. . to invoke the sweep of congressional authority . . . in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination.”342 Additionally, the ADA’s 
congressional findings echo the remedial nature of this statute, stating 
that discrimination towards people with disabilities is a societal 
                                                 
335 See also Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (finding that “employee” was 
ambiguous because it lacked a temporal modifier).  
336 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241. 
337 E.g., Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. 
338 Id.  
339 Id. at 345. 
340 Id. at 341.  
341 See 42 U.S.C.§ 12101(b). 
342 Id. (emphasis added).  
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problem.343 Thus, ambiguous ADA phrases should be interpreted 
according to the familiar statutory maxim that remedial statutes are 
construed broadly.344 Mixed-motive causation increases employee 
protection and is the appropriate construction.   
Even if the ambiguity cannot be resolved, an additional step in 
statutory analysis still indicates that “on the basis of” should authorize 
mixed-motive claims. If a proper interpretation cannot be gleaned 
from the statute’s text, courts should examine the legislative history 
behind the statutory text in order to ascertain the appropriate 
meaning.345 Legislative history pertaining to the 2008 ADA 
Amendments indicates that the inclusion of the phrase “on the basis 
of” was intended to serve the narrow purpose of correcting the Court’s 
interpretation in Sutton v. United Air Lines. In Sutton, the Court held 
that a person with a device that mitigates their impairments, such as 
glasses or contacts, was no longer deemed to have a disability under 
the ADA.346 Throughout the ADA Amendment Senate Report, the 
only reference to “on the basis of” related to the clarification of Sutton. 
In a section-by-section analysis of the changes that the Amendments 
Act would effectuate, the Senate Report comments regarding the 
inclusion of “on the basis of” were limited to:  
 
Discrimination on the Basis of Disability. Prohibits 
discrimination under Title I of the ADA “on the basis of 
disability” rather than “against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual.” 
Clarifies that covered entities that use qualification standards 
based on uncorrected vision must show that such a requirement 
is job-related and consistent with business necessity.347  
                                                 
343 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a). 
344 Briscoe v. Lattue, 460 U.S. 325, 348–49 (1983). 
345 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985) (“Because we 
find the statute ambiguous on its face, we seek guidance in the . . . relevant 
legislative history”). 
346 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 
347 Statement of Managers to Accompany S3406, The Americans with 
Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, 110th Cong. 154 (2008) (statements of Sen. 
Harkin and Sen. Hatch). 
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Thus the legislative intent shows that the change in causation 
phrasing was not intended to alter the plaintiff’s burden in showing 
discrimination or to create any meaningful deviation from the phrase 
“because of.”348 Rather, the change in the causation phrase was an 
inadvertent word choice occurring within a larger amendment that 
prohibited courts from considering mitigating devices when 
determining whether an employee had a disability under the ADA.349 
This legislative history indicates that Congress did not have an 
objective to change the causation scheme of the ADA.350 Prior to 
Gross and at the time of the 2008 ADA Amendments’ enactment, a 
vast majority of the circuit courts were applying mixed-motive 
causation to ADA claims.351 This indicates congressional intent that 
the ADA allow plaintiffs to recover under mixed-motive claims.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Given the frequency with which the Supreme Court hears 
antidiscrimination cases and the friction between Price Waterhouse 
and Gross, it is likely that the Court will soon explicitly define what 
particular causation scheme the ADA authorizes. In the interim, circuit 
courts should look to the rationale underlying the Court’s 
interpretations in Gross and Price Waterhouse. In doing so, circuit 
courts should rely on Price Waterhouse and authorize recovery under 
the ADA for mixed-motive claims.  
                                                 
348 See id.  
349 See id.  
350 See id.  
351 Supra, notes 26–27. 
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